The most dangerous idea in moments like these is the belief that you can purchase stability by sacrificing the rules that create stability. You can’t.
The most dangerous idea in moments like these is the belief that you can purchase stability by sacrificing the rules that create stability. You can’t.
When a powerful country faces a war of territorial conquest, it has two broad choices. It can treat borders, sovereignty, and treaties as real constraints—or it can treat them as negotiable, like line items in a deal. The second approach often markets itself as “pragmatic” or “anti-war.” In practice, it is one of the most reliable ways to make future wars more likely and more expensive.
That’s because conquest is not just a military act. It’s a test of whether the international system is governed by rules or by force. When force is rewarded, it becomes a business model. And when a business model is profitable, it scales.
The Backchannel Problem: When Diplomacy Becomes Personal, Not Constitutional
In a democratic system, foreign policy has structure for a reason. Formal diplomacy—through accountable offices, legal mandates, documented agreements, and treaty frameworks—creates durability. It’s enforceable, legible to allies, and constrained by law.
“Backchannel diplomacy” is something else. It means unofficial intermediaries, private conversations, and personalized negotiations that can bypass normal oversight. Sometimes backchannels exist even in healthy states, but the danger is when they become the main channel—when they are used to avoid accountability and weaken institutional foreign policy.
That shift matters because it turns national strategy into a personal project. It makes outcomes dependent on loyalty, leverage, and optics rather than law, alliances, or long-term stability. And it signals to adversaries that institutions can be bypassed—meaning they can be manipulated.
The Seductive Pitch: “Just Make a Deal”
The public-facing argument for deal-first diplomacy is familiar:
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“Stop the killing.”
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“We’re wasting money.”
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“It’s not our problem.”
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“Let’s be realistic.”
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“Offer incentives and everyone goes home.”
It sounds clean. It also dodges the core question: what kind of peace is being purchased, and who pays for it later?
A peace that rewards conquest does not end the logic of war. It validates it.
The “Pay Ukraine to Surrender” Idea Isn’t Realism — It’s Fantasy
One version of the deal-first pitch goes like this: Ukraine should concede territory, and then some massive economic settlement will compensate them—sometimes framed as payments Russia “owes,” sometimes framed as huge reconstruction money, sometimes floated in numbers so large they aren’t even tethered to budgets.
This fails on basics:
1) There’s no credible mechanism to extract “trillions”
Russia does not have the liquid capacity to fund vast reparations on demand, and even if it did, authoritarian regimes do not reliably pay after they get what they want. If someone proposes giant numbers without enforcement, what they’re really doing is using fantasy arithmetic to sell surrender as “reasonable.”
2) It treats the victim state as a bargaining chip
Ukraine is not a subsidiary. It is a sovereign country with citizens, elections, a national identity, and the right to exist. Any “deal” that assumes Ukraine must trade land for quiet is not neutral peace-making. It’s great-power bargaining over smaller nations—exactly the logic that fueled many of the 20th century’s disasters.
3) It guarantees the next war
If conquest produces territory at a discount, it becomes a repeatable strategy. That doesn’t just endanger Ukraine; it destabilizes every border region where an autocrat believes force can succeed.
The real question is not “Is peace good?” Of course peace is good. The question is: is this peace a ceasefire that locks in conquest, or a settlement that removes the incentive to invade again?
Rewarding conquest removes nothing. It advertises incentives.
Why Authoritarian “Deals” Break: Power Systems Don’t Negotiate Like Democracies
Democratic negotiation assumes:
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agreements matter,
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institutions enforce them,
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reputational costs exist,
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leaders change but the state remains.
Authoritarian negotiation often assumes:
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agreements are tactical pauses,
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enforcement is weakness,
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reputational costs are manageable through propaganda,
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power is personal and continuous.
That mismatch is why “strongman deals” are so fragile. They are often not designed to end a conflict; they are designed to manage pressure while preserving the ability to continue coercion later.
The Appeasement Trap Isn’t a Moral Story — It’s a Cost Curve
People argue about the word “appeasement” because it sounds like an insult. Forget the label. Focus on the cost curve.
When an aggressor learns that violence works, they:
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expand their demands,
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test new red lines,
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probe other neighbors,
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raise the price of future deterrence.
When defenders show that conquest fails, the aggressor’s options narrow, internal political costs rise, and future invasions become harder to sell domestically.
This is why resisting conquest earlier is often cheaper than stopping it later. It isn’t because defenders are virtuous. It’s because deterrence is an economic asset.
The Strategic Reality for the United States
For the U.S., support for Ukraine (through allies and lawful channels) has been a high-leverage strategy:
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It degrades a major adversary’s military capacity without U.S. troops fighting.
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It strengthens alliances and credibility.
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It reinforces a world where trade routes, borders, and treaty obligations remain meaningful.
A shift toward informal, personality-based “deal-making” does the opposite:
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It weakens alliances by making U.S. commitments look conditional and personal.
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It encourages adversaries to wait out institutions and court individuals.
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It makes future conflicts more likely by normalizing “land for peace.”
If you want fewer wars, the logic is simple:
make wars of conquest unprofitable.
The Civilizational Stakes: Rule-of-Law vs. Rule-by-Force
This isn’t abstract. Rule-by-force politics doesn’t stay abroad. When leaders normalize bypassing institutions to cut deals overseas, they normalize bypassing institutions at home.
Backchannels, loyalty systems, and contempt for constraint are not isolated tactics. They are how democracies get hollowed out—gradually, then suddenly.
A Clear Standard for Any “Peace Plan”
Any proposal worth taking seriously should meet these minimum tests:
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Ukraine’s sovereignty must be respected (Ukraine must consent freely, not under coerced abandonment).
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Territorial conquest cannot be legitimized as a reward.
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Security guarantees must be enforceable (not vibes, not promises).
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The plan must reduce future invasion incentives, not entrench them.
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The process must be constitutional and accountable (no private freelancing as national policy).
If a “deal” fails those tests, it’s not peace. It’s a pause that makes the next war likelier.
The Bottom Line
Again: The most dangerous idea in moments like these is the belief that you can purchase stability by sacrificing the rules that create stability. You can’t.
When conquest is rewarded, it spreads. When institutions are bypassed, they weaken. When diplomacy becomes personal rather than constitutional, national strategy becomes a private transaction—and private transactions are easy for authoritarians to exploit.
Peace is not a slogan. It’s a structure. And the structure that prevents future wars is the one that makes aggression fail—politically, economically, and militarily.
Cheers! Sláinte! Na zdravie!
