No matter how intense things feel right now? You can almost always count on them getting more intense later.
Makes you think.
Founded in 2010 by JZ Murdock
Long-form essays on culture, politics,
arts, media & speculative/creative thought.
This is a repost from May 31, 2010, that I chose to reshare today, on my birthday, August 30, 2026,
Mom was born on my birthday (long story, but funny). She passed in 2017. Love you mom.
I also have a pretty fascinating post out yesterday on my Substack about a very weird birthday I had, in Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada, some decades ago with my girlfriend at the time.
On a roll here--here's another birthday I had in 2014 in Bellingham, where one of my kids was living at the time, in my old university town from where I graduated in 1984 (what a year to graduate in, huh?).
So...
Hi! How has your weekend been? Your week? Your year? Not too stressful, I hope.
[Boy! Does THIS have a different meaning now than it did in 2010 when I first wrote this article!]
Also, an old 2011 blog I did on when I was a USAF Parachute Rigger.
No matter how intense things feel right now? You can almost always count on them getting more intense later.
Makes you think.
Here's a factual rundown of the major actions and disputes since January 2025 that critics have pointed to in this context.
Let's lay out what's documented, and flag where the "heading toward martial law" framing is a rapidly becoming settled fact—supporters of these policies generally offer different justifications (border security, bureaucratic efficiency, executive authority under existing law), so they can continue their actions even their supporters would be again. It offers them cover, as thinly veiled as it is to most of us.
Executive power and independent agencies
Military and law enforcement deployment domestically
Courts and judicial independence
Press, universities, and civil society
Immigration enforcement expansion
Election-related
A note on the framing itself
The specific claim that these actions are "meant to lead to martial law" is an interpretation advanced by advocacy groups (Human Rights Watch, Protect Democracy, the ACLU-adjacent press, and opinion writers)—it isn't something the administration has stated as intent, and no formal martial law declaration or Insurrection Act invocation has occurred as of this writing.
But why would the administration state their intended goals when it is martial law and autocracy?
Why even bring that up under these conditions?
That's a fair epistemological point, and it deserves a real answer.
While Trump is actually pursuing autocratic consolidation, he would have every reason to describe it as something else—"security," "efficiency," "restoring order." Stated intent is not reliable evidence either way; that's true of any actor with something to hide, and it's also true, less dramatically, of normal politicians who routinely dress up self-interested or power-consolidating moves in public-interest language.
So we can't say "they didn't call it autocracy, therefore it isn't" as they wish to have happen—but that is a weak inference and simply doesn't hold up.
They have used the guise of bringing the budge under control to cover their actions and give them ever lessening ability to do these actions.
There's a real, documentable version of that argument, worth laying out plainly:
DOGE-style cuts and Schedule F reclassification were framed as fiscal efficiency, but the practical effect was gutting the independent civil service protections and inspector-general oversight that historically made it harder for any administration to politicize agencies.
Efficiency and control aren't mutually exclusive—cutting an inspector general's office saves money and removes a watchdog simultaneously.
Even former DOGE members now admit their sheer ignorance and utter stupidity in their blind cuts of important institutions.
Several of the agencies hit hardest (CFPB, parts of the IRS, oversight offices) are ones that specifically constrain executive or corporate power, not just generic "waste." Reasonable critics argue that if this were purely about budget discipline, cuts would track cost-per-function more evenly rather than disproportionately hitting oversight and enforcement bodies.
Thought would have gone into it, planning, wise actions by those with knowledge of what was or needed to be done would have been involved, rather than marched out of their buildings, jobs and careers.
The Humphrey's Executor reversal wasn't a budget matter at all—it was about removal power over agency heads—but it arrived alongside the "shrink government" push and had the effect of making independent agencies dependent on presidential will rather than statutory insulation, regardless of their size or spending.
Timing: several of these moves (inspector general firings without the legally required 30-day notice, mass reclassification) happened in the first weeks of the term, before any serious budget analysis could plausibly have been done, which is consistent with the idea that "cost-cutting" was the vehicle rather than the driver.
The complicating factors
Every administration frames cuts to agencies it dislikes as fiscal responsibility—that's not unique to this one, and it doesn't by itself prove bad faith. Reagan's OMB, Clinton's "reinventing government," and others made similar arguments about entrenched bureaucracy, with a similar mix of genuine efficiency rationale and political convenience.
But then Reagan was the patron saint of the end result of much of what the Republican Party is today under Donald Trump, utterly ignoring his furter intent of his malignant narcissism and ill intent toward our government and citizens, who do not blinding support him. He has surrounded himself with "yes-men" which is always the alarm and eventual death knoll of dying democracies, being murdered in their own cradle of government.
It is also how autocracies self-immolate, eventually.
For to be told all the time that everything you are doing is great, that "all is well", when it is clearly not and the masses are actually rising against you (as they are now), is sheer suicide.
Some cuts have been reversed or blocked by courts, and some inspectors general were reinstated after litigation—meaning the legal system has at points functioned as a check, which cuts against a "budget as cover for unchecked power grab" story being fully successful, even if it was the attempt.
We are thankful for our courts and judges who have stood against this move to autocracy, with little or no thanks to those toxically conservative Justices on SCOTUS today
Whether removing statutory insulation from agencies is itself illegitimate is actually contested on the merits, separate from motive—"unitary executive theory" is a real, decades-old legal position (not invented for this purpose) holding that this insulation was constitutionally dubious to begin with.
So even sympathetic critics of Trump specifically have disagreed among themselves about whether the Humphrey's Executor outcome is a power grab or a correction of an old constitutional error.
Net: I think it's fair to say "budget discipline" has functioned as a permission structure that made some of these moves politically easier to sell and legally easier to defend, whether or not that was the primary motive going in.
Whether it was designed as cover from the start (it was), versus opportunistically exploited once cuts started producing convenient side effects (that too obviously happened), isn't something easily settled for many, sadly—but the pattern described here (nominal fiscal rationale, disproportionate impact on oversight/independence rather than generic cost centers) is a real and observed one, not a fringe read of the record.
When bringing into all this the Trump/MaGA/GOP toxic conservative game plan, Project 2025 and Trump's continuing claims of a 3rd or 4th presidential term, it all becomes rather clear rather quickly.
When you add in things like the Trump administration firing those in cybersecurity, so many expert throughout our government, all as we are being attacked from international enemies, like Iran, in retaliation for a war Trump needlessly started to distract yet again from the Epstein files release, needlessly attacking other countries (as in Venezuela) after having run on a political platform of "no more war," "no more forever wars", it all becomes ever more clear exactly what he is doing. And who and what he is.
A grifter. A career criminal. A documented serial and malignant career liar with unhealthy personality issues.
WHY America is sitting so idly by watching this man tear apart America, and our American government without acting, without removing him ASAP, or faster, is quite beyond not only the "pale", but the spirit of America under the guise of remaining America.
Iran is attacking our water systems, remotely.
And Trump's claim is what?
That state's Democratic leadership is incompetent.
It's ludicrous and only makes blatantly clear, Donald Trump is our greatest and domestic enemy and those not telling him the truth, too busy saying "Yes, sir" always, while enabling his demise of our American government and protections, is becoming ever harder to deny.
We are fooling ourselves. We have given ourselves a truly incompetent leader, after decades of conservatives claiming Democratic leaders are, that anyone but themselves are the ones who are truly incompetent.
We are being fooled.
We are allowing it to happen.
We do not have to do that.
Not by a long shot.
Cheers! Sláinte! Na zdravie!
JZ Murdock is a retired Senior Technical Writer/IT administrator, and an active award-winning author/ filmmaker, documentarian, and writer based in Bremerton, Washington.
He publishes commentary on the state of things at murdockinations.com and on his creative works over at Substack. He also posts on Slasher.com on the horror genre.
If this work means something to you, you can support it at Ko-fi. Tips are always welcome and go directly toward keeping independent documentary work possible.
I heard what sounded like a rifle shot this Saturday morning, and then all my power went out.
No wind. No storm. No branch down across a line. Just a sharp, flat crack from the pole outside my house, and then the particular silence of a home with no hum in it — no HVAC, no refrigerator compressor, no soft whir from the office down the hall. I've lived on the Kitsap Peninsula for nine years now, and this is the third transformer I've watched blow in that span. Three, on a property that isn't unusually large, isn't unusually loaded, and isn't served by some ancient spur line nobody's looked at since Eisenhower. Just an ordinary house that happens to sit under a piece of equipment that keeps failing.
The easy story — the one the utility will tell you if you call it in — is that this is weather. Old wiring, coastal damp, wind events, the occasional falling limb. And sure, sometimes that's exactly what it is, and there's not much to be done about a tree deciding to come down mid-gust. But a calm Saturday morning with clear skies doesn't fit that story. What blew today wasn't the weather's fault. Something inside that can finally gave out — insulation that had been quietly degrading for who knows how long, a connection that had been arcing in secret, a unit carrying more load than it was ever sized for. And nobody knew, because nobody was looking.
That's the part that should bother you more than the bang did.
Most pole-mounted transformers are dumb. No sensors, no telemetry, nothing reporting back to anyone. A utility typically finds out something's wrong in one of two ways: a scheduled visual inspection that might happen once every several years, or a customer calling in because their power just went out and their house sounded like a gun range for a second. That second method is, functionally, the maintenance plan. You are the sensor. Your blown modem is the diagnostic report.
And here's the thing — that's not because the alternative is impossible or even particularly expensive anymore. Retrofit monitoring points that track a transformer's temperature, load, and internal condition now run somewhere in the neighborhood of a few hundred to a couple thousand dollars per unit, no substation-grade infrastructure required. Utilities that have actually deployed this kind of monitoring at scale aren't finding it a wash — they're finding it saves money outright, because a proactive swap is a bucket-truck and an hour, while a reactive one after a bang like today's is an emergency dispatch, a longer outage, and often more damage to the hardware itself.
One Texas utility that built a proactive monitoring program using data it already had access to caught thousands of failing units before they failed and credited the program with saving millions of dollars and avoiding millions of minutes of customer outages. This isn't speculative technology. It's being done, today, by utilities that decided the juice was worth the squeeze.
So why isn't it standard? Because of whose ledger the costs land on. The utility's replacement cost is visible, budgeted, and rate-based — spending on infrastructure is literally how regulated utilities get compensated. What isn't on that ledger is my modem, my router, whatever's plugged into the wall in the office that didn't get the chance to shut down gracefully, the reset clocks, the food in a freezer if the outage runs long enough, the afternoon lost waiting for a crew. None of that is the utility's expense.
It's mine. It's yours. It's the neighbor's whose sump pump picked exactly the wrong week to need power. Add up nine years of that, times however many households sit downstream of aging equipment nobody's proactively checking, and the "cheaper to fix it when it breaks" math only works because most of the actual cost has been quietly handed to the customers standing under the pole.
Meanwhile the load on these systems keeps climbing. Every efficiency gain we get from newer appliances is getting eaten by more devices per household and, increasingly, an EV or two charging overnight on a transformer that was sized for a much smaller world. A unit that was marginal a decade ago may simply not be adequate now — and again, nobody's watching that shift happen in real time unless they've chosen to.
I don't think this is a mystery or a conspiracy. It's an incentive problem, plain and ordinary. The party that decides whether to monitor and replace proactively isn't the party that eats the cost of guessing wrong. Until that changes — through regulation, through customer pressure, through utilities deciding reliability data is worth collecting before the bang instead of after — a rifle shot on a calm Saturday morning is going to keep being the way I find out my transformer was tired.
Three for nine years now. I'd like a fourth to not happen.
Cheers! Sláinte! Na zdravie!
JZ Murdock is a retired Senior Technical Writer/IT administrator, and an active award-winning author/ filmmaker, documentarian, and writer based in Bremerton, Washington.
He publishes commentary on the state of things at murdockinations.com and on his creative works over at Substack. He also posts on Slasher.com on the horror genre.
If this work means something to you, you can support it at Ko-fi. Tips are always welcome and go directly toward keeping independent documentary work possible.
In this tine of "Corporate Thought" meaning no morals, no ethics, profit over all else, disinformation, post-truth, toxic conservatism, etc., our government no longer functions correctly due to having been set up with a consideration that people would not stoop as low as we have seen today's American conservatism and Republicans have.
Thus, we bow need corrections.
Here's a rundown of the institutional reforms that necessary in a post Trump-era of toxic GOP governance and the current SCOTUS (and some conservative judges) have pushed, organized by branch.
Presidency / executive power
Congress
Supreme Court / judiciary
Broader democratic guardrails
There is a script. It is older than anyone currently living. It goes like this:
I am not a criminal. I am a threat. And they hate me because of what I represent to you.
Al Capone knew it by heart.
By the late 1920s, Alphonse Gabriel Capone was the most powerful organized crime figure in America. He ran bootlegging, gambling, and prostitution across Chicago with an iron fist wrapped in a silk suit. He ordered murders. He bribed police captains, judges, and aldermen wholesale. The Saint Valentine's Day Massacre -- seven men machine-gunned in a garage on his orders -- was so brazen it shook the country.
And yet Al Capone's public posture, maintained with remarkable consistency, was that of a persecuted man.
"Every time a boy falls off a tricycle, every time a black cat has gray kittens, every time someone stubs a toe, every time there's a murder or a fire or the marines land in Nicaragua," Capone said, "the police and the newspapers holler 'get Capone.'"
He wasn't just complaining. He was building a brand. Capone cultivated a Robin Hood image, donated to soup kitchens during the Depression, made himself accessible to reporters, and cast himself as a simple businessman being singled out by hypocrites. "When I sell liquor, it's called bootlegging," he pointed out. "When my patrons serve it on Lake Shore Drive, it's called hospitality." He told crowds he had "spent the best years of my life giving people the lighter pleasures, helping them have a good time," and received in return only "abuse, the existence of a hunted man."
This country wanted booze, he said. He organized it. Why should he be called a public enemy?
The argument was not without a certain populist electricity. Prohibition was absurd. The rich did drink openly while working-class men went to jail. The cops Capone bribed were on every other corner. He was telling people things they already half-believed, and wrapping himself in their grievances as insulation against his own accountability.
His defense attorney argued at trial that the tax prosecution was simply a pretext -- that the government wasn't really after tax fraud, it was just trying to "stow Al Capone away." The jury should not, he told them, be a party to persecution in a time of public excitement.
The jury convicted him anyway. He died at 48, his mind destroyed by syphilis, the empire he built already in ruins.
But the script survived him.
Donald Trump did not invent the populist criminal's persecution narrative. He inherited it, refined it, and ran it at a scale Capone could never have imagined -- not across one city, but across an entire country, through television, social media, and the machinery of a major political party.
The playbook is identical. Only the costumes changed.
Where Capone said "every time something goes wrong, they blame me," Trump told his supporters at a Waco rally: "They're not coming after me. They're coming after you. I'm just standing in the way." The logic is the same move, executed a century apart. The criminal reframes his own legal accountability as an attack on the people who love him.
Where Capone cast himself as a simple man meeting a public demand -- beer, whiskey, a good time -- Trump cast himself as a simple man giving people what they wanted: jobs, a wall, a middle finger pointed at the people who looked down on them. "From the time I came down the golden escalator," Trump said after his first indictment, the radical left had been engaged in a witch hunt "to destroy the Make America Great Again movement." Not him. The movement. You.
Where Capone pointed at the hypocrisy of Prohibition -- the law applied selectively, to the poor and the ethnic, while the wealthy drank freely -- Trump pointed at real and perceived hypocrisy in the justice system: Hillary Clinton's emails, Hunter Biden's laptop, the two-tiered application of law. Some of those complaints had genuine substance. That's the point. The hustle works best when it's built on a foundation of things that are actually true.
Trump claimed the prosecution "would immediately stop" if he decided not to run for president -- framing his legal exposure as purely political, a weapon aimed not at a man who broke the law, but at a movement that threatened power. He compared his situation to Alexei Navalny dying in an Arctic prison. He called it "the existence of a hunted man."
Capone would have recognized that phrase. He used it himself.
Here is where the comparison becomes not just rhetorical but precise.
Capone ran an organization built on intimidation and bribery, surrounded himself with men willing to commit violence on his behalf, and corrupted every institution he could reach -- police, courts, city hall. He positioned this as American enterprise. "My rackets are run on strictly American lines," he said. He was not knocking the system. He was just using it.
Trump surrounded himself with what a presidential historian called "a team of felons" -- eleven top allies convicted or having pled guilty, their combined sentences totaling roughly thirty years. He pressured the Justice Department to prosecute his political enemies. He urged his attorney general to go after Hillary Clinton. He leaned on election officials in Georgia to "find" votes. He was impeached twice. He was convicted on 34 felony counts. He pardoned rioters who broke into the Capitol at his encouragement, including the first man to breach the building.
And throughout all of it, his line never wavered: this is persecution. They are doing this because of who I am, and what I mean to you.
The crucial difference between Capone and Trump is that Capone never got his hands on the actual machinery of the state. He had to bribe it from the outside. Trump won the presidency twice. He used the Justice Department as a tool of personal vengeance. He pardoned his own criminal associates. He sat in the Oval Office and directed federal power at his enemies while simultaneously claiming to be a victim of federal power.
Capone claimed he was being hunted. Trump made himself the hunter, from inside the building, while still claiming to be the prey.
The populist criminal's greatest trick is not the lie. It's the grain of truth.
Capone was right that Prohibition was selectively enforced. Trump is right that the justice system does not treat everyone equally. Both men took that truth, swallowed it whole, and used it to insulate themselves from consequences for things that had nothing to do with inequality and everything to do with their own appetites for power and money.
Capone's defense attorney told the jury: don't be a party to persecution in a time of public excitement.
Trump's supporters say the same thing today, at a volume that shakes windows.
But here is what the script always leaves out: the question of whether the government is treating you fairly is entirely separate from the question of whether you did the things they say you did.
Al Capone did the things they said he did.
Donald Trump did the things they said he did.
The jury that convicted Capone did not acquit him because he made them feel good at rallies. The question of what we do with that fact -- what we do with a man who turned the oldest hustle in American crime into the platform of a presidency -- is not a question about him.
It is a question about us.
Cheers! Sláinte! Na zdravie!
JZ Murdock is a retired Senior Technical Writer/IT administrator, and an active award-winning author/ filmmaker, documentarian, and writer based in Bremerton, Washington.
He publishes commentary on the state of things at murdockinations.com and on his creative works over at Substack. He also posts on Slasher.com on the horror genre.
If this work means something to you, you can support it at Ko-fi. Tips are always welcome and go directly toward keeping independent documentary work possible.
Citizens United gave speech to power. It never gave truth to anyone.
Why isn't our Body Politic just as important?
Isn't it MORE important?
There is a law in the United Kingdom that makes it a criminal offense to knowingly make a false statement about a political candidate's personal character or conduct during an election. It lives inside the Representation of the People Act 1983, Section 106, and it is not theoretical. Candidates have been prosecuted under it.
Courts have taken it seriously. The British legal tradition holds, without apology, that democracy requires a baseline of factual honesty about the people competing for power. Lie about your opponent's record on policy, fine. That is politics. Lie about who he is, what he did, what she said, what they are, and you have committed an offense against the process itself.
The United States has no such law. It cannot have one, according to the current Supreme Court's reading of the First Amendment. Political speech is the most protected category of expression under American constitutional doctrine, and the Court has repeatedly signaled that the government has almost no power to regulate it based on its truth or falsity. We are, by law, a country where you may lie about your political opponents without limit, so long as the lie does not meet the high bar of defamation, which requires proof of actual malice and damages that are notoriously difficult to establish for public figures.
This was always a flaw in the American system. But it was a manageable flaw, held in check by practical barriers: journalism, peer accountability, the sheer logistics of mass communication. Then came Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, decided in 2010 by a five-to-four Supreme Court majority, and the flaw became a wound. A wound that has not stopped bleeding since.
Citizens United rests on a foundational claim: that corporations are persons under the First Amendment, and that political spending is a form of speech, and therefore that limiting how much a corporation can spend on political messaging is an unconstitutional restriction on free expression. Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote the majority opinion. He argued that the government had no business deciding which speakers were worthy of constitutional protection and which were not. To restrict corporate speech, he said, was to create a two-tiered system in which some voices could be silenced by the state.
This reasoning has a seductive internal logic. If you accept the premise that corporations are persons with speech rights, the rest follows. The problem is the premise itself, and the downstream contradiction it creates that nobody in the majority seemed to notice, or chose to acknowledge.
If corporations are people, and corporations compose the body politic through their spending and messaging and political participation, then the body politic is people. Not metaphorically. Legally. Structurally. The architecture of democratic participation that Citizens United helped to build is one in which artificial legal entities, backed by concentrations of wealth that no actual human being commands, flood the political commons with messaging that is subject to no truth standard whatsoever.
The body politic, understood as the aggregate of citizens who form a political community and participate in its governance, has now been reconstituted to include entities that cannot vote, cannot serve, cannot be imprisoned, cannot die, and have no direct stake in the outcome of the society their money shapes. And those entities speak into that political commons with the full protection of the First Amendment, spreading whatever messages serve their financial interests, true or false, fair or fabricated.
The UK looked at this problem and said: lies about candidates are an affront to the democratic process. We criminalize them because the body politic, which is made of actual people with actual lives, deserves to make decisions based on something approaching reality.
The United States, post-Citizens United, has said the opposite, functionally if not explicitly: the body politic is open to all comers, including artificial persons with unlimited resources, and we will not discriminate based on the truthfulness of their messages. The marketplace of ideas will sort it out.
The marketplace of ideas has not sorted it out. It has instead been cornered by the best-funded vendors, who have discovered that lies are cheaper to produce than truths, faster to spread than corrections, and significantly more effective at generating the emotional states that drive political behavior.
The British legal tradition's language is worth sitting with. Section 106 frames false statements about candidates as an affront against the body politic. Not merely as a harm to the individual candidate, which defamation law would address. As an affront against the collective process of democratic governance. Against the body politic as such.
This is a meaningful distinction. When you lie about a candidate's personal character during an election, you are not merely injuring that person. You are corrupting the information environment in which citizens make decisions. You are polluting the commons. You are committing what amounts to a fraud against the electorate, who are entitled to make their choices based on something resembling reality.
American law does not recognize this category of harm. We have libel and slander, which protect individuals. We have fraud statutes, which protect commercial relationships. We have perjury laws, which protect judicial proceedings. But we have no legal mechanism that says: lying to voters about their candidates is an offense against democracy itself.
Citizens United made this absence catastrophic by removing the practical constraints that had kept it from fully metastasizing. Before 2010, the money that could be spent on political messaging was limited. Political organizations had to identify themselves. Coordination rules created at least some friction between wealthy donors and campaign messaging. None of this was a truth requirement. But it slowed the machine.
After Citizens United, dark money flowed into super PACs. The infrastructure of political lying scaled. A single donor or a single industry could now fund a campaign of disinformation at a level that no opposing voice, however well-funded by normal human standards, could match. The asymmetry between a lie and its correction, which was always present, became overwhelming. A lie can be produced for the cost of a press release. A correction requires research, verification, dissemination, and an audience already disposed to receive it. At scale, with unlimited money behind the lie and none guaranteed for the correction, the lie wins most of the time.
Justice John Paul Stevens wrote a dissent in Citizens United that has aged with uncomfortable precision. He argued that the Court's ruling would damage the integrity of elected institutions. He argued that corporations are not members of the political community in any meaningful sense. He argued that the identity of the speaker is relevant to the government's interest in preventing corruption and the appearance of corruption.
He was not listened to. He was in the minority.
Justice Stevens was talking about corruption in the financial-influence sense, the familiar concern that money in politics buys favorable policy outcomes. This is real and it is serious. But there is a second form of corruption that the Citizens United framework enabled and that the majority did not adequately weigh: the corruption of the information environment itself.
When unlimited money can be spent on political messaging with no truth requirement attached, the information environment becomes systematically corrupted. Not by any single act of lying, but by the structural incentive that unlimited money creates for producing and amplifying lies that serve the funder's interests. The marketplace of ideas fails not because people are stupid but because the market has been cornered. A monopoly on information is not less dangerous to democracy than a monopoly on voting.
We have built, through a combination of constitutional doctrine and corporate law and the economics of digital media, a system in which the most powerful speakers in the political commons are entities with no democratic accountability, no obligation to truth, and no limit on spending. We call this freedom of speech. The British, with their quaint little criminal statute about lying to voters, might call it something else.
It would be too easy to lay all of this at the feet of Citizens United. The decision accelerated and amplified a problem that was baked into the American approach to political speech from the beginning. The First Amendment's resistance to government regulation of political content has always meant that the United States would not build the kind of legal infrastructure around political truth that other democracies have. The trade-off was made. The idea was that free speech would be self-correcting, that the truth would win in open competition, that democracy would be resilient enough to absorb even vigorous disinformation.
That was not an insane bet to make in 1791, or even in 1950. The information environment was slow enough, local enough, and expensive enough to produce and distribute that the self-correcting mechanisms had time to operate. There were fewer actors, with lower reach, who could spread political lies. The town square had a manageable size. The body politic could, more or less, sort things out.
The digital information environment, post-Citizens United, is not a town square. It is a planetary-scale amplification system with no editorial standards, governed by engagement algorithms that systematically reward the emotionally inflammatory over the factually accurate, accessible to anyone with money and a message, including artificial legal persons with unlimited resources and no stake in the society they are shaping.
The flaw was always there. We chose not to close it because we valued something else: the principle that government should not be in the business of deciding what is true in political discourse. That principle is not without merit. Governments lie too. Governments abuse truth ministries. The instinct to keep the state out of the business of political epistemology has a real history behind it.
But the instinct has produced a structure that, under current conditions, advantages exactly the actors who are most willing to lie and most able to fund the amplification of those lies. The self-correcting market we hoped for has not materialized. What has materialized is a machine for the industrial production of political unreality, protected by the same constitutional guarantees that were meant to keep citizens free.
The UK model is not a perfect solution. Section 106 applies to false statements about candidates' personal character, not to false statements about policy, or about history, or about the imagined consequences of the opponent's governance. It is limited in scope and has its own ambiguities. Prosecutions under it are relatively rare. It is not a truth machine. It is a specific, bounded legal acknowledgment that certain kinds of political lying are offenses against the democratic process.
What would it require to build something comparable in the United States? At minimum, it would require a different constitutional jurisprudence, one willing to recognize that political communities have a legitimate interest in the factual integrity of electoral discourse. It would require the Court to acknowledge that the body politic, which Citizens United has now constitutionally reconstituted to include artificial persons, is composed at its core of actual human beings who are materially harmed when the information environment in which they make decisions is systematically corrupted.
It would also require a political will that is currently absent, because the actors who benefit most from the current system are the ones most likely to block any attempt to change it. Unlimited money in politics buys, among other things, the political influence to keep unlimited money in politics.
But the contradiction sits there, regardless of whether anyone has the will to resolve it. If corporations are people under the First Amendment, and if those corporate persons now constitute a significant part of the body politic's voice, then the body politic is, legally speaking, people. And the body politic deserves what actual democratic theory has always said it deserves: a political commons in which factual accountability is not optional.
Citizens United gave speech to power. It gave amplification to money. It never gave truth to anyone. And a democracy that cannot distinguish, legally or structurally, between its citizens and its corporations, between speech and disinformation, between political argument and political fraud, is a democracy in the process of hollowing itself out from the inside.
The British have a word for what happens when you lie about a candidate to voters. They call it an offense. We have a word for it too. We call it protected speech. The difference between those two answers is the difference between a democracy that believes it has something worth protecting and one that has decided the protection itself is too dangerous to attempt.
We chose the latter. We are living with the results.
Cheers! Sláinte! Na zdravie!
JZ Murdock is a retired Senior Technical Writer/IT administrator, and an active award-winning author/ filmmaker, documentarian, and writer based in Bremerton, Washington.
He publishes commentary on the state of things at murdockinations.com and on his creative works over at Substack. He also posts on Slasher.com on the horror genre.
If this work means something to you, you can support it at Ko-fi. Tips are always welcome and go directly toward keeping independent documentary work possible.