Vladimir Putin launched his full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 with the apparent expectation that it would be quick, decisive, and largely invisible to the Russian public.
More than four years later, it has been none of those things.
What has emerged instead is a portrait of a regime slowly consuming itself: generals killed by car bombs in Moscow suburbs, a president hiding in bunkers along the Black Sea coast while state media runs pre-recorded footage to maintain the illusion of normalcy, and a security apparatus so fractured its chiefs are openly blaming each other in Kremlin meetings. The numbers below tell part of the story. The rest is told by the silence of Russian elites who have quietly stopped saying "we" when they talk about the war, and started saying "his."
MILITARY CASUALTIES
CSIS estimates Russian forces suffered nearly 1.2 million battlefield casualties, including killed, wounded, and missing, between February 2022 and December 2025, with roughly 415,000 in 2025 alone, at an average of nearly 35,000 per month. To put that in historical context, Russia has suffered roughly five times as many fatalities in Ukraine as in all Russian and Soviet wars combined between the end of World War II and the start of the full-scale invasion in 2022. Center for Strategic and International StudiesCenter for Strategic and International Studies
Russia's rate of advance since January 2024 has averaged between 15 and 70 meters per day in its most prominent offensives, slower than almost any major offensive campaign in any war in the last century. Center for Strategic and International Studies
GENERALS KILLED
The deaths of 15 Russian generals have been officially confirmed. In December 2024, Lieutenant General Igor Kirillov, head of the Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Protection Troops, was killed by a bomb in Moscow. In April 2025, Lieutenant General Yaroslav Moskalik, a senior officer in the General Staff's Main Operational Directorate, was killed by a car bomb in a Moscow suburb. In December 2025, Lieutenant General Fanil Sarvarov, head of the Operational Training Directorate of the Russian General Staff, was killed in Moscow by another car bomb. In July 2025, a strike on the headquarters of the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade killed at least six officers, including the Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Navy. Zona Media
PUTIN IN BUNKERS / HEIGHTENED SECURITY
The Kremlin has dramatically increased personal security around Putin, installing surveillance systems in the homes of close staffers, prompted by a wave of assassinations of top Russian military figures and fears of a coup. Cooks, bodyguards and photographers who work with the president are banned from traveling on public transport. Visitors to the Kremlin must be screened twice, and those working close to Putin can only use phones without internet access. CNN
Putin and his family have stopped visiting their residences in the Moscow region and in northwestern Valdai. He is now spending extended periods in bunkers, including in the Krasnodar area in southern Russia, while state media uses pre-recorded footage to project normality. i24NEWS
He has not visited a military facility in 2026 so far, despite regular trips in 2025. CNN
Intelligence reports indicate Putin fears not so much Ukrainian attacks as a conspiracy by Russian political elites. Sergei Shoigu, the former Defense Minister and current Security Council Secretary, is specifically associated with the risk of a coup attempt. UNN
At the Kremlin's May 9 Victory Day parade this year, no members of the State Duma were invited to Red Square, reportedly to reduce the number of people in close proximity to Putin. The Federal Protective Service has been given broad powers over information policy, personally approving any media appearances involving the president. Surveillance tools once used for criminal investigations have been redirected to monitor government officials. Militarnyi
INTERNAL SECURITY AGENCY CONFLICT
After the assassination of Sarvarov in December 2025, tensions between security agencies exploded during a meeting where Chief of the General Staff Gerasimov sharply criticized the FSB for failing to detect assassination plots. FSB Director Bortnikov responded by criticizing the Defense Ministry for lacking its own protection unit. Head of the National Guard Zolotov refused to allocate his agency's resources to protect Defense Ministry officers. Militarnyi
A former Kremlin insider noted that "a very big battle for power is going on" and that "the FSB and the administration are very much in conflict." HotAir
THE ECONOMIST: PUTIN LOSING HIS GRIP
An anonymous former senior Russian government official writing in The Economist described how senior officials, regional governors and businessmen have stopped using the first-person plural when talking about state actions. As recently as last spring, everything was "we" and "ours." Now they describe what is happening as "his" story, not "ours." His decisions are described as "strange." Even stranger, the author notes, is the fact that he decides anything at all. Substack
The author frames it as a political "zugzwang," the chess term for a position where every available move worsens your situation. He identifies four converging factors: the rising cost of a war designed to be invisible to most Russians; a new demand for rules among elites cut off from London courts and offshore vehicles; roughly 5 trillion rubles in private assets confiscated over three years, the largest redistribution of property since the 1990s privatizations; and a geopolitical climate that is eroding the specific asymmetries Russia historically exploited. Hvylya
The future, he writes, is no longer discussed as something Putin will decide, but as something that will unfold independently of him, and possibly already without him. Substack
ECONOMIC DETERIORATION
Russia's GDP contracted 1.8% in the first two months of 2026. Putin acknowledged the issue in a government meeting on economic affairs in mid-April. HotAir
Russia's economy shrank 0.3% between January and March 2026, the first contraction since early 2023. The public deficit ballooned to $60 billion in the same period, exceeding the full-year target. Inflation remains stuck near 6% under an interest rate of 14.5%. Euronews
Oil and gas revenues in 2025 came in at 8.7 trillion rubles, well below the planned 10.9 trillion. To compensate, the government has raised VAT from 20% to 22% starting January 2026, and utility bills are projected to jump another 13% in 2026, the highest increase since the war began. The Moscow Times
When ordinary Russians were asked in BBC interviews what they hoped for in 2026, a striking number answered with a single word: peace. Several said they no longer plan their lives months or years ahead. One summed up the mood: "Five years? If I look ahead 10 days, it's good." EUvsDisinfo
An anonymous former senior Russian official, writing recently in The Economist, reached for a chess metaphor to describe where Putin now stands: zugzwang, the position where every available move only worsens your situation. The war was supposed to preserve his power. Instead it has become the engine of its erosion. What comes next, no one inside Russia appears to know, including the people closest to him. That uncertainty, more than any battlefield statistic, may be the most significant development of the entire conflict.
I wish us all well...
Cheers! Sláinte! Na zdravie!
JZ Murdock is a retired Senior Technical Writer/IT administrator, and an active award-winning author/ filmmaker, documentarian, and writer based in Bremerton, Washington.
He publishes commentary on the state of things at murdockinations.com and on his creative works over at Substack. He also posts on Slasher.com on the horror genre.
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