Showing posts with label sanctions. Show all posts
Showing posts with label sanctions. Show all posts

Sunday, May 10, 2026

Special Edition: Russia Is Eating Itself: The Slow Collapse of Putin's War State

Vladimir Putin launched his full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 with the apparent expectation that it would be quick, decisive, and largely invisible to the Russian public. 

More than four years later, it has been none of those things. 

Donald Trump, is not far outside of this club.

What has emerged instead is a portrait of a regime slowly consuming itself: generals killed by car bombs in Moscow suburbs, a president hiding in bunkers along the Black Sea coast while state media runs pre-recorded footage to maintain the illusion of normalcy, and a security apparatus so fractured its chiefs are openly blaming each other in Kremlin meetings. The numbers below tell part of the story. The rest is told by the silence of Russian elites who have quietly stopped saying "we" when they talk about the war, and started saying "his."

 

MILITARY CASUALTIES

CSIS estimates Russian forces suffered nearly 1.2 million battlefield casualties, including killed, wounded, and missing, between February 2022 and December 2025, with roughly 415,000 in 2025 alone, at an average of nearly 35,000 per month. To put that in historical context, Russia has suffered roughly five times as many fatalities in Ukraine as in all Russian and Soviet wars combined between the end of World War II and the start of the full-scale invasion in 2022. Center for Strategic and International StudiesCenter for Strategic and International Studies

Russia's rate of advance since January 2024 has averaged between 15 and 70 meters per day in its most prominent offensives, slower than almost any major offensive campaign in any war in the last century. Center for Strategic and International Studies


GENERALS KILLED

The deaths of 15 Russian generals have been officially confirmed. In December 2024, Lieutenant General Igor Kirillov, head of the Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Protection Troops, was killed by a bomb in Moscow. In April 2025, Lieutenant General Yaroslav Moskalik, a senior officer in the General Staff's Main Operational Directorate, was killed by a car bomb in a Moscow suburb. In December 2025, Lieutenant General Fanil Sarvarov, head of the Operational Training Directorate of the Russian General Staff, was killed in Moscow by another car bomb. In July 2025, a strike on the headquarters of the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade killed at least six officers, including the Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Navy. Zona Media


PUTIN IN BUNKERS / HEIGHTENED SECURITY

The Kremlin has dramatically increased personal security around Putin, installing surveillance systems in the homes of close staffers, prompted by a wave of assassinations of top Russian military figures and fears of a coup. Cooks, bodyguards and photographers who work with the president are banned from traveling on public transport. Visitors to the Kremlin must be screened twice, and those working close to Putin can only use phones without internet access. CNN

Putin and his family have stopped visiting their residences in the Moscow region and in northwestern Valdai. He is now spending extended periods in bunkers, including in the Krasnodar area in southern Russia, while state media uses pre-recorded footage to project normality. i24NEWS

He has not visited a military facility in 2026 so far, despite regular trips in 2025. CNN

Intelligence reports indicate Putin fears not so much Ukrainian attacks as a conspiracy by Russian political elites. Sergei Shoigu, the former Defense Minister and current Security Council Secretary, is specifically associated with the risk of a coup attempt. UNN

At the Kremlin's May 9 Victory Day parade this year, no members of the State Duma were invited to Red Square, reportedly to reduce the number of people in close proximity to Putin. The Federal Protective Service has been given broad powers over information policy, personally approving any media appearances involving the president. Surveillance tools once used for criminal investigations have been redirected to monitor government officials. Militarnyi


INTERNAL SECURITY AGENCY CONFLICT

After the assassination of Sarvarov in December 2025, tensions between security agencies exploded during a meeting where Chief of the General Staff Gerasimov sharply criticized the FSB for failing to detect assassination plots. FSB Director Bortnikov responded by criticizing the Defense Ministry for lacking its own protection unit. Head of the National Guard Zolotov refused to allocate his agency's resources to protect Defense Ministry officers. Militarnyi

A former Kremlin insider noted that "a very big battle for power is going on" and that "the FSB and the administration are very much in conflict." HotAir


THE ECONOMIST: PUTIN LOSING HIS GRIP

An anonymous former senior Russian government official writing in The Economist described how senior officials, regional governors and businessmen have stopped using the first-person plural when talking about state actions. As recently as last spring, everything was "we" and "ours." Now they describe what is happening as "his" story, not "ours." His decisions are described as "strange." Even stranger, the author notes, is the fact that he decides anything at all. Substack

The author frames it as a political "zugzwang," the chess term for a position where every available move worsens your situation. He identifies four converging factors: the rising cost of a war designed to be invisible to most Russians; a new demand for rules among elites cut off from London courts and offshore vehicles; roughly 5 trillion rubles in private assets confiscated over three years, the largest redistribution of property since the 1990s privatizations; and a geopolitical climate that is eroding the specific asymmetries Russia historically exploited. Hvylya

The future, he writes, is no longer discussed as something Putin will decide, but as something that will unfold independently of him, and possibly already without him. Substack


ECONOMIC DETERIORATION

Russia's GDP contracted 1.8% in the first two months of 2026. Putin acknowledged the issue in a government meeting on economic affairs in mid-April. HotAir

Russia's economy shrank 0.3% between January and March 2026, the first contraction since early 2023. The public deficit ballooned to $60 billion in the same period, exceeding the full-year target. Inflation remains stuck near 6% under an interest rate of 14.5%. Euronews

Oil and gas revenues in 2025 came in at 8.7 trillion rubles, well below the planned 10.9 trillion. To compensate, the government has raised VAT from 20% to 22% starting January 2026, and utility bills are projected to jump another 13% in 2026, the highest increase since the war began. The Moscow Times

When ordinary Russians were asked in BBC interviews what they hoped for in 2026, a striking number answered with a single word: peace. Several said they no longer plan their lives months or years ahead. One summed up the mood: "Five years? If I look ahead 10 days, it's good." EUvsDisinfo

An anonymous former senior Russian official, writing recently in The Economist, reached for a chess metaphor to describe where Putin now stands: zugzwang, the position where every available move only worsens your situation. The war was supposed to preserve his power. Instead it has become the engine of its erosion. What comes next, no one inside Russia appears to know, including the people closest to him. That uncertainty, more than any battlefield statistic, may be the most significant development of the entire conflict.

I wish us all well...

Cheers! Sláinte! Na zdravie!



JZ Murdock is a retired Senior Technical Writer/IT administrator, and an active award-winning author/ filmmaker, documentarian, and writer based in Bremerton, Washington. 

He publishes commentary on the state of things at murdockinations.com and on his creative works over at Substack. He also posts on Slasher.com on the horror genre.

If this work means something to you, you can support it at Ko-fi. Tips are always welcome and go directly toward keeping independent documentary work possible.


Monday, March 23, 2026

The Pipeline to Moscow

War in Iran. Other issues leading up to it. So, where are we exactly? Let's review...shall we?

An administration that systematically dismantled every alternative to fossil fuel dependency, started a war that made that dependency a crisis, then used the crisis to reward the foreign government that benefits most from America never leaving the 20th century energy system.

Russia?

Yes.

What does this timeline tell us?

It tells us that what looks like a series of independent domestic energy policy decisions produced, with remarkable consistency, a single strategic outcome: the United States entered a major Middle East war with no renewable energy buffer, exhausted its emergency petroleum reserve, and was forced to ease sanctions on Russia at the exact moment those sanctions were beginning to work.

Every individual action had a defensible policy framing. "Energy dominance." "Grid reliability." "Reducing regulatory burden." "Stopgap measure." None of those framings are obviously false in isolation. That's what makes the sequence striking -- you don't need any single action to be indefensible. You just need all of them to point the same direction, which they do, without exception, over 13 months.

A few specific things stand out:

The vocabulary erasure in February is underrated. Banning the words internally at the energy efficiency office isn't a policy -- it's a suppression of the institutional capacity to think in those terms. You can't build what you can't name.

The April coal EO and the May legislative demolition of IRA tax credits happened before the Iran war was even on the horizon as an imminent event. Those decisions locked in the vulnerability. By the time February 28 arrived, there was nothing to fall back on that wasn't tied to global oil markets.

The Russia piece is the one that doesn't have a clean innocent explanation. By March 2026 the administration had spent a year arguing that sanctions on Russia were a priority. Those sanctions were measurably working -- oil revenue down from 45% to 20% of the federal budget.

Then one phone call with Putin and a war-driven price spike, and the sanctions are partially unwound within a week. Zelenskyy noticed. The Europeans noticed. The argument that it was purely reactive to the Hormuz closure runs into the fact that Europe faced the same crisis and refused to do the same thing.

What the timeline tells you overall is that the framing of "energy dominance" was always about which energy sources dominate -- not about American independence from volatile global markets. The one energy sector that actually insulates Americans from Middle East oil shocks -- domestic renewables, priced locally, not subject to Hormuz -- was the one systematically eliminated. That's not an accident of priorities. That's a choice with a direction.

Whether it's corruption, ideology, or just the logical endpoint of who funds what in American politics is a separate question. The timeline doesn't answer that. But it does make the innocent explanation -- that these were just a series of unrelated domestic policy preferences that happened to converge on this outcome -- very hard to sustain.

Summarizing what this describes for an administration that follows this timeline, what supports these actions as a desired endpoint?

The desired endpoint, if you follow the logic of every action rather than the stated rationale, is this:

An America permanently dependent on fossil fuels, with the institutional, legal, and financial capacity to transition away from them dismantled at every level -- regulatory, legislative, scientific, and linguistic -- while the industries that benefit from that dependence are subsidized, protected, and politically entrenched for a generation.

What supports these actions is a coalition of interests that all converge on the same outcome, even if they don't share identical motives:

The fossil fuel industry gets the obvious thing -- market protection from a cheaper competitor that was beginning to outprice them without subsidies. Solar and wind were winning on economics alone by 2024. That had to be stopped by policy because it couldn't be stopped by the market.

The petrostate adjacency -- and this is where Russia becomes impossible to ignore -- is that high oil prices and a weakened energy transition benefit Moscow structurally. Not just in the short term of the Iran war windfall. A US that stays oil-dependent stays exposed to exactly the kind of leverage Russia and Gulf states have always held. An America running on domestic solar and wind is geopolitically emancipated in a way that a Russia or a Saudi Arabia cannot afford.

The ideological component is real but secondary. The climate denial framework -- calling the Endangerment Finding into question, erasing the vocabulary, dismissing the science -- isn't just belief. It's institutional capture. If you eliminate the legal basis for federal climate action and the professional class trained to execute it, the next administration that wants to reverse course finds an empty building. That's not policy disagreement. That's succession planning for a permanent outcome.

The political economy underneath all of it is Citizens United and what it enabled -- the fossil fuel donor class having essentially unmediated access to both legislative and executive decision-making. You don't need a conspiracy when the incentive structure produces the behavior automatically.

So what this administration describes, taken as a coherent whole rather than a series of discrete decisions, is a government that has been captured by the industries most threatened by the energy transition, executing a systematic rollback of every mechanism that transition depended on, while a war they started handed the greatest near-term benefit to the foreign government that has the most to lose if that transition ever completes.

The endpoint isn't energy dominance. The endpoint is energy lock-in. A country that cannot structurally leave the 20th century energy system regardless of what a future administration wants to do, because the financial incentives, the legal framework, the scientific infrastructure, and the institutional vocabulary to do otherwise have all been removed.

That's what the timeline describes. Whether it was designed that way or simply fell that way because of who was in the room making the decisions -- that's the question historians will spend a long time on. But the outcome is the same either way.

So, in a sentence...

An administration that systematically dismantled every alternative to fossil fuel dependency, started a war that made that dependency a crisis, then used the crisis to reward the foreign government that benefits most from America never leaving the 20th century energy system.

Russia?

Yes.

Cheers! Sláinte! Na zdravie!



Thursday, July 3, 2025

Why Did North Korea Build the Wonsan‑Kalma Beach Resort"

North Korea just opened a beach resort for 20,000 people. But who will visit?

🌊 Why North Korea Built the Wonsan‑Kalma Beach Resort

1. Economic shortfall meets foreign currency hunger

  • Tourism as one of few UN‑sanction‑compliant cash streams
    With most sectors crippled by sanctions on weapons and finance, tourism offers one of the limited ways North Korea can earn foreign currency legally.

  • Domestic spending & elite rewards
    The resort can absorb local leisure demand and serve as a luxury reward site for regime loyalists or officials—effectively diverting money within the system while projecting prestige

2. Leadership propaganda and legacy building

  • “Kim’s greatest feat” narrative
    Kim Jong‑un lauded the resort as one of the year’s greatest achievements, shifting the spotlight from military to modern infrastructure and tourism ambitions 

  • Dynastic symbolism & image staging
    Kim’s wife and daughter prominently attended the inauguration—blurring lines between family image, succession messaging, and national symbolism 

3. Strategic deepening of relations with Russia

  • Exclusive early access for Russian tourists
    Russian tour groups are expected to be among the first allowed guests—reflecting close bilateral ties, tourism diplomacy, and possible reciprocal aid during the Ukraine war 

  • Transport links reopening
    The reopening of a passenger rail connection hints at economic cooperation and a controlled route for tourism flows from Russia

4. Prestige shock value & global ambition

  • North Korea’s answer to Western beach destinations
    Branded by South Korean press as “North Korea’s Waikiki,” the resort is clearly intended to impress both foreign and domestic observers 

  • Grandiose scale confirming regime power
    A decade in the making, the scale and ambition echo past prestige builds like the Ryugyong tower—intended to show resilience despite isolation 

5. Control and social engineering

  • Tourism strictly managed
    North Korea tightly regulates tourism—tourists travel only via state‐approved guides and routes. This ensures no cultural infiltration but also limits appeal to serious leisure travelers 

  • Prestige over actual utility
    Massive investments go into these resorts, but infrastructure, staffing, and accessibility may be insufficient to sustain 20,000 guests consistently 


🧳 Who Might Actually Visit—and Why

Domestically: North Korean citizens (limited elite and loyalty-based access)

  • Starting July 1, 2025, North Koreans are allowed to visit in theory—but usually, only approved citizens or local elites are permitted. Images show happy locals splashing in slides and pools—but this scene is tightly engineered and only within state media frameworks 

Russian tourists (limited group tours)

  • The first Russian packages are scheduled around July 7, 2025, under close state supervision. Only select regions in Russia, like Primorsky Krai, are funneling in tourists.

  • These visits serve propaganda and diplomatic purposes more than genuine tourism exchange.

Occasional Western or Chinese visitors (uncertain and rare)

  • While North Korea has gradually eased border closures since 2023, access for Western or general Chinese tourists remains tightly restricted. Only guided tours approved through state agencies are permitted.

  • There's skepticism about mass appeal: high cost, limited itinerary variability, visa restrictions, and a controlled experience dissuade most serious tourists.

💼 Non‑tourist uses

  • Elite getaways for officials and propaganda events, delegation visits from allied regimes, or military cultural shows may dominate usage over genuine leisure tourism.


⚠️ Dark Realities Behind the Glamour

  1. Human rights and coerced labor concerns
    Some reports suggest the resort’s infrastructure might involve forced labor, raising moral and physical exploitation concerns.

  2. Regime preservation through spectacle
    The spectacle masks systemic issues: poverty, repression, and lack of basic rights. Tourism funds may reinforce elite privilege instead of public welfare.

  3. Fragile financial viability
    A resort built for tens of thousands but likely serving dozens per day (e.g. state media estimates 170 daily crowd despite 20,000 capacity) suggests unsustainable empty infrastructure 

    • If only domestic elites and a trickle of Russians visit, the payoff may be marginal relative to construction cost.

  4. Geopolitical signal more than tourism ambition
    The real utility may be signaling to allies, projecting internal unity, and demonstrating development despite sanctions—but not necessarily opening to meaningful travel flows.

Also, while the resort isn’t built for Trump, its existence can:

  • Reinforce his image as a "negotiator"

  • Contrast his diplomacy with Biden’s hawkishness

  • Echo his use of spectacle to sell success

  • Boost his base’s admiration for authoritarian “efficiency”

Even propaganda in Pyongyang can ripple into Trumpworld.


✍️ Final Thoughts

North Korea’s Wonsan‑Kalma beach resort is as much a political and propagandistic trophy as it is a tourism venture. While the resort is officially built for up to 20,000 visitors, reality suggests that:

  • Domestic visits will be tightly controlled, elite‑centric, and symbolic.

  • Foreign tourists are limited to sanctioned Russian groups.

  • Mass tourism is unrealistic until broader liberalization occurs.

Yet every splash, every photo-op, every guided group at the beach serves multiple regime aims: currency gain, global prestige, internal propaganda, elite reinforcement, and diplomatic signaling.

The resort will likely remain more a stage for performance than a genuine beach holiday destination—for now, at least.


Compiled with aid of ChatGPT

Friday, April 4, 2025

Putin, Dugin, and Trump: The Geopolitical Challenge Facing America

Alexander Dugin is a Russian philosopher, political theorist, and strategist known for his far-right and nationalist ideas. He is considered one of the most influential intellectuals behind Vladimir Putin’s geopolitical vision and has developed a distinctive worldview that challenges Western liberalism, democracy, and globalism.


Who is Alexander Dugin?

Dugin is often associated with the ideology of Eurasianism, which emphasizes the idea that Russia, rather than being a part of Europe or Asia, should lead a unique Eurasian civilization. He is a vocal critic of liberal democracy and Western values, seeing them as threats to the survival of traditional Russian culture, values, and political systems. His philosophy blends Russian Orthodox Christianity, traditionalism, nationalism, and anti-modernism. Dugin is also a prominent advocate for an authoritarian system that rejects the principles of liberal democracy, which he believes lead to decadence, moral decay, and societal breakdown.

Dugin’s work, particularly his book "Foundations of Geopolitics", has been highly influential within certain circles of Russian politics and military strategy. His vision of a "multipolar world" contrasts with the Western-led "unipolar" world order, which he sees as dominated by the U.S. and its allies. He advocates for a new international order, where Russia plays a central role, asserting itself against the West.

Putin’s Relationship with Dugin’s Beliefs

Putin’s policies and rhetoric, especially in recent years, reflect a certain alignment with Dugin’s ideas, particularly regarding nationalism, anti-liberalism, and anti-Western sentiments. Although it’s difficult to say how directly Putin subscribes to Dugin's specific philosophy, Dugin has been described as a key ideological figure whose ideas resonate with the Kremlin’s foreign and domestic policies. Here are the key ways Putin has embraced Dugin’s beliefs:

  1. Anti-Western Sentiment:

    • Both Dugin and Putin are staunchly critical of Western liberalism, seeing it as morally corrupt, decadent, and a threat to Russia’s traditional values. Putin has positioned Russia as a defender of conservative and Christian values in opposition to what he perceives as the permissiveness and liberalism of the West.

    • Dugin’s ideas, particularly the rejection of liberal democracy, mirror Putin’s own distrust of Western-style political systems and his promotion of a strong, centralized state under his control.

  2. Eurasianism and Russia’s Role in Global Politics:

    • Dugin’s philosophy of Eurasianism calls for Russia to assert its dominance over the Eurasian landmass, rejecting the West's political and cultural dominance. This has been reflected in Putin’s foreign policy, especially in his actions in Ukraine, Georgia, and other former Soviet republics, where he has sought to reassert Russian influence and challenge Western power.

    • Dugin envisions Russia leading a coalition of countries (often referred to as the "Eurasian bloc"), which would challenge the global order dominated by the U.S. and Europe. Putin’s actions in Ukraine and Syria can be seen as part of this broader vision of establishing Russia as a counterbalance to U.S. hegemony.

  3. The Rejection of Globalism:

    • Dugin is a vocal critic of globalism, the idea that countries should be governed by global institutions and international norms. He believes that this undermines national sovereignty and leads to the erosion of cultural and religious identities.

    • Putin has positioned Russia as a champion of national sovereignty, particularly in opposition to Western-led international institutions like the European Union (EU) and NATO. He has used rhetoric that positions Russia as a defender of the "multipolar world," a world where power is not concentrated in the hands of a few Western countries.

What They Are Doing to Support These Beliefs Against America and for Russia

  1. Ukraine and the "Eurasian Sphere":

    • One of the most significant actions taken by Russia under Putin that aligns with Dugin’s beliefs is the invasion and annexation of Crimea in 2014, followed by the ongoing conflict in eastern Ukraine. This move was justified by Putin as necessary to protect Russian speakers and culture, but it also fits within the broader Eurasian vision of reasserting Russian influence in territories once part of the Soviet Union.

    • Dugin has openly supported these actions, viewing them as part of Russia’s rightful return to its place as the leader of a Eurasian bloc. He also sees Ukraine as a critical part of this vision, often referring to it as the "heartland" of Eurasia.

  2. Promotion of Anti-Liberal Values:

    • Putin has sought to promote Russian Orthodox Christianity as a unifying force in Russia, positioning it against the secularism of the West. This resonates with Dugin’s traditionalist views, which stress the importance of religion in society and politics.

    • Russia’s opposition to LGBTQ+ rights, its push for conservative family values, and its crackdown on opposition movements all align with Dugin’s idea of a society that rejects liberal freedoms in favor of order and traditionalism.

  3. Cyber Warfare and Disinformation:

    • Russia, under Putin’s leadership, has been accused of using cyber warfare and disinformation campaigns to destabilize Western democracies, particularly the U.S. during the 2016 presidential election. This aligns with Dugin’s idea of undermining Western influence and sowing chaos in the political systems of liberal democracies.

    • Dugin’s geopolitical ideas also encourage the use of unconventional methods to achieve strategic goals, including the use of information warfare to destabilize the U.S. and European Union.

  4. Energy and Economic Influence:

    • Russia has leveraged its control over energy supplies, especially natural gas and oil, as a tool of geopolitical influence. By using energy as leverage, Russia under Putin has sought to deepen its ties with Eurasian countries while also undermining Western sanctions and economic influence.

    • This economic strategy is part of a broader effort to reduce Russia’s dependence on the West and assert its dominance within the Eurasian region.

Dugin’s ideas, particularly his vision of a multipolar world led by Russia and his rejection of liberal Western values, resonate with Putin’s worldview and have influenced many of his policies. While the extent of their personal relationship and alignment is not fully clear, it is evident that Putin has adopted certain aspects of Dugin’s philosophy, especially in terms of nationalism, anti-Western rhetoric, and the quest for Russian dominance in Eurasia. Together, they advocate for a Russia that pushes back against American global leadership and the liberal international order, positioning Russia as a defender of tradition, sovereignty, and an alternative vision for global politics.

Putin's connection to various philosophers and ideologies, including figures like Alexander Dugin, is often viewed through a complex and controversial lens. Dugin, in particular, is known for his far-right, nationalist, and anti-liberal views, advocating for Eurasianism, which emphasizes Russia's unique role in world history and its need to assert its power against the West.