Showing posts with label Russia. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Russia. Show all posts

Monday, September 28, 2026

The Formula - A thought experiment, followed to the end

A note before reading:

This is a thought experiment, and it is labeled as one for a reason. It takes a formula that many people have quietly run in their heads, states it plainly, and tests it link by link to see whether it holds. It does not. Nothing here advocates violence against anyone. The piece exists to follow a dangerous idea to its end and show where it breaks, because ideas left unexamined do more damage than ideas taken apart in daylight. Read it to the last line before deciding what it says. 

I am a humanist, a Buddhist of sorts, and I wish harm on no human being. Therein lies much of our problem today against those who do not share that orientation. 

The answer is not to become them. Still, one must think it through. What follows does.

Here is the formula, stated plainly.

Remove Putin. Remove whoever reaches for the chair next, and the one after, until a Russian leader emerges who wants back into the world. Moscow, stung, answers in kind, and the American president falls to hands no one sees. Neither country's opposition carries the stain. Both are freed. Peace follows.

It has a terrible symmetry. Two countries locked in death spirals by two men. Two oppositions that cannot act without inheriting the illegitimacy of the act. One exchange that frees them both.

Plenty of people have run some version of it in their heads. Few have run it to the end. So test it. Link by link.

Link one: remove Putin

This is the strongest link, and it deserves to be taken seriously. The war is unusually personal. Putin wrote the essays denying Ukrainian nationhood. He made the decision in a small room with a smaller circle. Russian elections cannot remove him; this month's managed vote returned his party as designed. The people bleeding for the war cannot vote their way out, speak their way out, or walk out.

There is evidence that leadership removal matters. Economists Benjamin Jones and Benjamin Olken studied a century of assassination attempts on national leaders and found that successful killings of autocrats were followed by moves toward democracy more often than failed attempts were. Stalin's death in 1953 was followed within months by an armistice in Korea and the end of the Doctors' Plot.

So link one holds, as a proposition: Russia without Putin might be a different Russia. Keep that in mind. It matters at the end.

Link two: remove the next, and the next

Here the formula starts to strain. The constitution hands power to the prime minister. Behind him stand the security services, people who survived twenty-five years by being the most careful and most ruthless in the room.

Each removal teaches the survivors one lesson: the West kills Russian leaders. The ones who rise next are the ones built for a siege. The filter does not select for the rational. It selects for the paranoid.

And someone has to decide who counts as rational. Whoever makes that call is choosing Russia's leader. Russians have seen this before, in other countries, and so have we. Iran, 1953. The installed leader held power for a quarter century. Then came the revolution, and the grievance still shapes Iranian politics seventy years later. A leader chosen by elimination abroad is a leader illegitimate at home.

Link three: Moscow answers in kind

This is where the formula contradicts itself.

It requires the new Russian leadership to be two things at once: rational enough to want back into the international community, and willing to kill an American president. Those are not compatible. A rational leader seeking reentry does not commit the one act guaranteed to make reentry impossible. Through forty years of Cold War, with every motive and every capability, neither Washington nor Moscow killed the other's head of state. Not from squeamishness. From calculation. Both understood what came after.

If the retaliation comes instead from the security hardliners in the interval, before the rational leader arrives, then the formula has handed the decisive act to exactly the people it was designed to filter out.

Link four: no one carries the stain

This is the load-bearing beam. The whole formula exists to solve one problem: the domestic opposition cannot act without inheriting the act.

But the stain does not disappear when the hand is foreign. It moves.

If Russia is identified, Russia owns it, and the United States is at war footing with a nuclear power. If Russia is not identified, the vacuum fills with certainty in every direction. John F. Kennedy had a known shooter, and sixty years later most Americans still suspect a conspiracy. A death with no author would be assigned one within the hour, along tribal lines. Tens of millions would name the American left no matter what the evidence said.

The formula does not remove the stain. It distributes it to everyone.

Link five: both countries are freed

The American half of the premise holds that the movement lives only in the man. Remove him and it dissolves.

History says otherwise. Perón was exiled in 1955 and died in 1974; Peronism still structures Argentine politics. Chávez died of cancer in 2013; Chavismo continued through Maduro. Personalist movements survive their founders routinely. They survive best when the founder is taken from them. A sudden vacancy would not end the movement. It would hand it a martyr and hand the successor a mandate.

And it would hand the state a pretext. The Reichstag burned on February 27, 1933. The emergency decree came the next day. In Butler, Pennsylvania, in July 2024, a gunman produced not collapse but a raised fist and a wave of sympathy. A government already testing emergency powers would not treat a sudden vacancy as an ending. It would treat it as an opening.

Link six: peace follows

The final link asks the United States to make peace with the state that killed its president. No American public would accept it. No American government could survive proposing it. The formula ends not in peace but in the war it was built to prevent, this time between the two largest nuclear arsenals on earth.

The verdict

On the American side, the formula fails at every link after the first. It does not break the spiral. It feeds it, then hands the spiral a martyr, a pretext, and a foreign enemy.

On the Russian side, the question stays open.

Link one held. Russia without Putin might be a different Russia. What the formula got wrong was not the destination but the hands. Every case where a leader's death changed a country's course for the better shares one feature: the change came from inside. Stalin's successors ended the terror because they feared it themselves, not because anyone abroad made them.

Whether that happens in Russia depends on whether the people around Putin decide the war costs them more than it gives them. That calculation is happening now, in rooms no one outside can see. The outside world can raise the price. It cannot pick the outcome.

Hundreds of thousands dead. One man ordering it. The arithmetic is real.

The formula is not. 

Cheers! Sláinte! Na zdravie!



JZ Murdock is a retired Senior Technical Writer/IT administrator, and an active award-winning author/ filmmaker, documentarian, and writer based in Bremerton, Washington. 

He publishes commentary on the state of things at murdockinations.com and on his creative works over at Substack. He also posts on Slasher.com on the horror genre.

If this work means something to you, you can support it at Ko-fi. Tips are always welcome and go directly toward keeping independent documentary work possible.


Monday, June 29, 2026

The Genius That Wasn't: Trump, Global Power, and the Architecture of American Decline

With reference to Janes' The World of Intelligence podcast - Energy Security in Crisis.


There is a version of the Donald Trump foreign policy narrative that frames him as a strategic disruptor -- a chaos agent whose unconventional moves keep adversaries off-balance and produce outcomes conventional thinkers can't see coming. It's an appealing story. It's also wrong, and the evidence accumulating across global energy markets, naval competition, and great power rivalry makes that increasingly hard to argue around.

Let's start with the oil.

The Energy Compression and What It Actually Does

Global oil supply has been driven down to levels not seen since the early 1980s. The stated logic -- squeeze petrostates, starve adversary revenue streams, demonstrate American energy dominance -- has a surface plausibility. And yes, it applies real pressure to Russia and Iran, both of whom depend on oil income to fund their political arrangements.

Janes' most recent episode of The World of Intelligence, "Energy Security in Crisis," featuring Ben Cahill of the Atlantic Council, examines precisely this terrain: the unprecedented shock stemming from the Gulf region, the implications for countries reliant on energy resources, and the complex market adjustments underway. What that framing captures, and what the Trump-as-genius narrative glosses over, is that energy shocks don't hit only adversaries. They reshape the entire global system simultaneously, and not all the reshaping favors the United States. apple

China imports the vast majority of its oil. Suppressed global prices lower Chinese industrial costs while simultaneously gutting Russian and Iranian state budgets. The squeeze intended to harm enemies is delivering a structural economic subsidy to the one competitor that poses the deepest long-term challenge. That's not a strategic masterstroke. That's playing chess while looking at only one corner of the board.

The Weapons Depletion Problem

Ukraine consumed the buffer. This is the blunt reality that no amount of rhetorical reframing changes. American precision munitions stocks, particularly in the categories relevant to any Pacific conflict -- anti-ship missiles, long-range precision strike, air defense interceptors -- were drawn down significantly in support of Ukrainian operations. The U.S. defense industrial base is not built for rapid replenishment. The gap between consumption rate and production rate is not a bureaucratic inconvenience; it is a strategic vulnerability with a specific consequence: any sustained conflict in the Taiwan Strait runs into a munitions wall within weeks.

Depleting those stockpiles while simultaneously degrading alliance relationships, withdrawing from NATO burden-sharing commitments, and undermining the diplomatic architecture that enables forward basing is not a calculated gamble. It is the elimination of multiple redundancies simultaneously, with no plan for what comes next if the opening phase of a conflict doesn't produce a quick resolution.

That pattern -- overwhelming early pressure, declare victory, exit before consequences arrive -- is not confined to military strategy. It's the operating methodology of Trump's entire professional life. Which brings us to the naval comparison that may be the sharpest analytical lens available right now.

Two Navies Built for the Same Wrong War

Janes dedicated a full episode on June 1st to China's naval expansion: "China's Naval Ambition: Capability, Credibility and Global Impact," examining what the rapid modernisation of the People's Liberation Army Navy really means for regional stability and global security, drawing on unclassified intelligence, satellite imagery and long-term capability assessment. The conclusion Janes' analysts reach is the one that should be at the center of every serious strategic conversation right now: scale alone does not equal power, and the discussion explores where capability outpaces operational credibility. appleapple

This is the crux. The PLAN has built an impressive fleet on paper. What it has not built is the institutional foundation that makes a navy actually effective in sustained combat: deep crew experience, genuine logistical reach, underway replenishment capability, a maintenance culture, and the organizational adaptability that comes from decades of real operational stress.

The PLAN is optimized for a specific scenario -- overwhelming first-salvo coercion within the first island chain, forcing a decision before American force projection can respond meaningfully. If that first salvo works, the fleet doesn't need to come home. If it doesn't work, the doctrine has no compelling answer for what follows.

This is not a coincidence. It is a structural parallel to Trump's own operating logic: maximum opening pressure, bet everything on the adversary folding fast, no viable plan for a long game. A navy built around a "don't worry if the ship doesn't make it back to port" assumption is not a sustainable instrument of global power. It is a one-shot coercion tool dressed up in the visual language of great power competition.

The U.S. Navy, by contrast, is built precisely for the scenario the PLAN cannot handle -- sustained, logistics-intensive, globally distributed naval warfare with redundant systems, experienced sailors, and a culture of improvisation under fire developed over eight decades of continuous operations. That structural advantage is real. The problem is that Trump is systematically dismantling the political and industrial conditions that make it usable when it matters.

Russia: The Patient Strategist in a Corner

Russia doesn't fit the short-horizon model and shouldn't be forced into it. Putin is genuinely a long-game thinker -- willing to absorb catastrophic short-term losses (Ukraine has been devastating by any honest accounting of Russian casualties and equipment) in pursuit of objectives measured in decades, not news cycles.

But the war has exposed something important: Russian military doctrine and Russian military reality diverged sharply from the opening weeks. Precision munitions exhausted early. Conscript quality degraded. The tactical innovation that the Russian military had cultivated on paper failed to materialize at scale under real combat conditions.

Janes covered Ukraine's deep-strike operations in a February episode -- specifically Operation Spiderweb, Ukraine's meticulously planned series of drone strikes reaching deep into Russian territory, disrupting strategic bomber bases from European Russia to the Far East -- and the intelligence assessment of the damage illustrated something the raw battlefield numbers don't fully capture: Russia's long-range aviation and nuclear deterrent posture have been meaningfully degraded, not just tactically inconvenienced. apple

The oil compression hits Russia at its budget floor. Their state fiscal model requires sustained prices above roughly $70-80 per barrel to maintain the social contract Putin depends on. Below that floor, the pressure builds -- slowly, tolerably at first, then in ways that start to matter politically. Putin can absorb it. He cannot absorb it indefinitely.

The deeper problem for Russia is strategic: they have become functionally a junior partner to China. Russian oil flows to Chinese markets. Russian industry depends on Chinese components. Russian diplomacy operates under Chinese cover internationally. Putin traded long-term strategic independence for survival, and China is not reciprocating as an equal -- it is absorbing Russia as a captive resource dependency. Even if Putin achieves his Ukraine objectives, he emerges from this decade as a supplier state to his nominal partner. That is a significant strategic loss dressed up as a geopolitical win.

A financially cornered Russia is not a safer Russia, however. It is a more dangerous one. The nuclear dimension doesn't disappear when conventional options narrow -- it expands. That's the other side of the energy compression equation that the Trump-as-genius narrative doesn't account for.

Iran: The Asymmetric Architect

Iran is the most genuinely strategic actor in this picture, and the one most consistently underestimated. The proxy network -- Hezbollah, the Houthis, Iraqi militia networks -- took forty years to build. That is not transactional thinking. That is architecture.

Janes examined Iran's internal situation in January: Iran's latest wave of protests, sparked by currency collapse, was forcefully suppressed by a highly layered security apparatus, with elite cohesion and information control shaping events -- and the assessment was that the regime remains intact for now, while external pressures and nuclear ambitions intersect with domestic unrest in ways that will shape Iran's next moves. apple

Iran's genius is asymmetric cost imposition. They cannot beat the United States or Israel in a conventional engagement. They have never needed to. The Houthis disrupting Red Sea shipping is the model in miniature: minimal investment, maximum disruption, no direct fingerprints that force a decisive military response. Every dollar the U.S. spends intercepting Houthi drones is a dollar not spent on PLAN deterrence. Every diplomatic cycle consumed by Iranian proxy activity is a cycle not spent on alliance maintenance in the Pacific. Iran doesn't win by defeating America. It wins by keeping America too busy and too expensive to focus where it needs to.

The nuclear dimension is Iran's ultimate leverage card. Domestic instability and economic pressure don't make Iran abandon that card -- they accelerate the timeline for using it as a deterrent, because a nuclear-armed Iran is an Iran that cannot be attacked. The energy compression and the diplomatic isolation Trump has pursued don't moderate Iranian nuclear ambitions. They incentivize acceleration.

The Convergence That Doesn't Require Coordination

The most important thing to understand about China, Russia, and Iran is that they don't need a formal alliance to pursue aligned objectives. They need overlapping interests -- and right now their interests align almost perfectly around a single strategic goal: a United States that is weapons-light, diplomatically isolated, domestically divided, and unable to sustain commitment to any long-horizon conflict.

Trump is delivering all four conditions simultaneously. This doesn't require him to be an agent of any of these powers. It requires only that his operating methodology -- short-horizon, resource-exhausting, alliance-degrading, optimized for the quick win -- produces outcomes that benefit patient, long-game adversaries regardless of intent.

Janes has been tracking grey zone and hybrid warfare as the defining security challenge of the current moment -- the use of tactics below the threshold of armed conflict, blending kinetic and non-kinetic activity to disrupt societies, undermine trust and complicate decision-making. What that framing captures is that the competition isn't primarily military anymore. It's about whether democratic societies can maintain the will, the institutional coherence, and the industrial capacity to respond when the military moment arrives. apple

On every one of those dimensions, the current trajectory is moving in the wrong direction.

The Bottom Line

Trump is not a genius playing a long game that conventional analysts can't see. He is a short-horizon actor whose methodology happens to be exquisitely useful to adversaries who are playing the longest game in contemporary geopolitics. The oil suppression that was supposed to squeeze enemies is subsidizing China's industrial costs. The weapons depletion that was supposed to signal strength has created a munitions gap that constrains real military options. The alliance degradation that was supposed to demonstrate independence has isolated the United States from the relationships that make sustained conflict survivable.

The PLAN built a navy optimized for a quick, coercive first strike and doesn't much care if the ships come home. Trump governs with the same logic -- overwhelming opening pressure, bet on the fast win, no viable doctrine for what comes after. The structural parallel is not flattering to either.

What neither the PLAN nor Trump has is what the United States actually built over eighty years and is currently in the process of dismantling: redundancy, sustained commitment, institutional depth, and the capacity to absorb a bad opening and still win the long war.

The question now is whether enough of that capacity survives to matter when it's needed.


For deeper intelligence analysis on these themes, Janes' The World of Intelligence podcast with Sean Corbett AVM (Retd) is available at the link above. Recent episodes on energy security, Chinese naval ambitions, grey zone warfare, and Iran's internal trajectory are directly relevant to the dynamics examined here.

Cheers! Sláinte! Na zdravie!



JZ Murdock is a retired Senior Technical Writer/IT administrator, and an active award-winning author/ filmmaker, documentarian, and writer based in Bremerton, Washington. 

He publishes commentary on the state of things at murdockinations.com and on his creative works over at Substack. He also posts on Slasher.com on the horror genre.

If this work means something to you, you can support it at Ko-fi. Tips are always welcome and go directly toward keeping independent documentary work possible.

Sunday, May 10, 2026

Special Edition: Russia Is Eating Itself: The Slow Collapse of Putin's War State

Vladimir Putin launched his full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 with the apparent expectation that it would be quick, decisive, and largely invisible to the Russian public. 

More than four years later, it has been none of those things. 

Donald Trump, is not far outside of this club.

What has emerged instead is a portrait of a regime slowly consuming itself: generals killed by car bombs in Moscow suburbs, a president hiding in bunkers along the Black Sea coast while state media runs pre-recorded footage to maintain the illusion of normalcy, and a security apparatus so fractured its chiefs are openly blaming each other in Kremlin meetings. The numbers below tell part of the story. The rest is told by the silence of Russian elites who have quietly stopped saying "we" when they talk about the war, and started saying "his."

 

MILITARY CASUALTIES

CSIS estimates Russian forces suffered nearly 1.2 million battlefield casualties, including killed, wounded, and missing, between February 2022 and December 2025, with roughly 415,000 in 2025 alone, at an average of nearly 35,000 per month. To put that in historical context, Russia has suffered roughly five times as many fatalities in Ukraine as in all Russian and Soviet wars combined between the end of World War II and the start of the full-scale invasion in 2022. Center for Strategic and International StudiesCenter for Strategic and International Studies

Russia's rate of advance since January 2024 has averaged between 15 and 70 meters per day in its most prominent offensives, slower than almost any major offensive campaign in any war in the last century. Center for Strategic and International Studies


GENERALS KILLED

The deaths of 15 Russian generals have been officially confirmed. In December 2024, Lieutenant General Igor Kirillov, head of the Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Protection Troops, was killed by a bomb in Moscow. In April 2025, Lieutenant General Yaroslav Moskalik, a senior officer in the General Staff's Main Operational Directorate, was killed by a car bomb in a Moscow suburb. In December 2025, Lieutenant General Fanil Sarvarov, head of the Operational Training Directorate of the Russian General Staff, was killed in Moscow by another car bomb. In July 2025, a strike on the headquarters of the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade killed at least six officers, including the Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Navy. Zona Media


PUTIN IN BUNKERS / HEIGHTENED SECURITY

The Kremlin has dramatically increased personal security around Putin, installing surveillance systems in the homes of close staffers, prompted by a wave of assassinations of top Russian military figures and fears of a coup. Cooks, bodyguards and photographers who work with the president are banned from traveling on public transport. Visitors to the Kremlin must be screened twice, and those working close to Putin can only use phones without internet access. CNN

Putin and his family have stopped visiting their residences in the Moscow region and in northwestern Valdai. He is now spending extended periods in bunkers, including in the Krasnodar area in southern Russia, while state media uses pre-recorded footage to project normality. i24NEWS

He has not visited a military facility in 2026 so far, despite regular trips in 2025. CNN

Intelligence reports indicate Putin fears not so much Ukrainian attacks as a conspiracy by Russian political elites. Sergei Shoigu, the former Defense Minister and current Security Council Secretary, is specifically associated with the risk of a coup attempt. UNN

At the Kremlin's May 9 Victory Day parade this year, no members of the State Duma were invited to Red Square, reportedly to reduce the number of people in close proximity to Putin. The Federal Protective Service has been given broad powers over information policy, personally approving any media appearances involving the president. Surveillance tools once used for criminal investigations have been redirected to monitor government officials. Militarnyi


INTERNAL SECURITY AGENCY CONFLICT

After the assassination of Sarvarov in December 2025, tensions between security agencies exploded during a meeting where Chief of the General Staff Gerasimov sharply criticized the FSB for failing to detect assassination plots. FSB Director Bortnikov responded by criticizing the Defense Ministry for lacking its own protection unit. Head of the National Guard Zolotov refused to allocate his agency's resources to protect Defense Ministry officers. Militarnyi

A former Kremlin insider noted that "a very big battle for power is going on" and that "the FSB and the administration are very much in conflict." HotAir


THE ECONOMIST: PUTIN LOSING HIS GRIP

An anonymous former senior Russian government official writing in The Economist described how senior officials, regional governors and businessmen have stopped using the first-person plural when talking about state actions. As recently as last spring, everything was "we" and "ours." Now they describe what is happening as "his" story, not "ours." His decisions are described as "strange." Even stranger, the author notes, is the fact that he decides anything at all. Substack

The author frames it as a political "zugzwang," the chess term for a position where every available move worsens your situation. He identifies four converging factors: the rising cost of a war designed to be invisible to most Russians; a new demand for rules among elites cut off from London courts and offshore vehicles; roughly 5 trillion rubles in private assets confiscated over three years, the largest redistribution of property since the 1990s privatizations; and a geopolitical climate that is eroding the specific asymmetries Russia historically exploited. Hvylya

The future, he writes, is no longer discussed as something Putin will decide, but as something that will unfold independently of him, and possibly already without him. Substack


ECONOMIC DETERIORATION

Russia's GDP contracted 1.8% in the first two months of 2026. Putin acknowledged the issue in a government meeting on economic affairs in mid-April. HotAir

Russia's economy shrank 0.3% between January and March 2026, the first contraction since early 2023. The public deficit ballooned to $60 billion in the same period, exceeding the full-year target. Inflation remains stuck near 6% under an interest rate of 14.5%. Euronews

Oil and gas revenues in 2025 came in at 8.7 trillion rubles, well below the planned 10.9 trillion. To compensate, the government has raised VAT from 20% to 22% starting January 2026, and utility bills are projected to jump another 13% in 2026, the highest increase since the war began. The Moscow Times

When ordinary Russians were asked in BBC interviews what they hoped for in 2026, a striking number answered with a single word: peace. Several said they no longer plan their lives months or years ahead. One summed up the mood: "Five years? If I look ahead 10 days, it's good." EUvsDisinfo

An anonymous former senior Russian official, writing recently in The Economist, reached for a chess metaphor to describe where Putin now stands: zugzwang, the position where every available move only worsens your situation. The war was supposed to preserve his power. Instead it has become the engine of its erosion. What comes next, no one inside Russia appears to know, including the people closest to him. That uncertainty, more than any battlefield statistic, may be the most significant development of the entire conflict.

I wish us all well...

Cheers! Sláinte! Na zdravie!



JZ Murdock is a retired Senior Technical Writer/IT administrator, and an active award-winning author/ filmmaker, documentarian, and writer based in Bremerton, Washington. 

He publishes commentary on the state of things at murdockinations.com and on his creative works over at Substack. He also posts on Slasher.com on the horror genre.

If this work means something to you, you can support it at Ko-fi. Tips are always welcome and go directly toward keeping independent documentary work possible.


Monday, March 23, 2026

The Pipeline to Moscow

War in Iran. Other issues leading up to it. So, where are we exactly? Let's review...shall we?

An administration that systematically dismantled every alternative to fossil fuel dependency, started a war that made that dependency a crisis, then used the crisis to reward the foreign government that benefits most from America never leaving the 20th century energy system.

Russia?

Yes.

What does this timeline tell us?

It tells us that what looks like a series of independent domestic energy policy decisions produced, with remarkable consistency, a single strategic outcome: the United States entered a major Middle East war with no renewable energy buffer, exhausted its emergency petroleum reserve, and was forced to ease sanctions on Russia at the exact moment those sanctions were beginning to work.

Every individual action had a defensible policy framing. "Energy dominance." "Grid reliability." "Reducing regulatory burden." "Stopgap measure." None of those framings are obviously false in isolation. That's what makes the sequence striking -- you don't need any single action to be indefensible. You just need all of them to point the same direction, which they do, without exception, over 13 months.

A few specific things stand out:

The vocabulary erasure in February is underrated. Banning the words internally at the energy efficiency office isn't a policy -- it's a suppression of the institutional capacity to think in those terms. You can't build what you can't name.

The April coal EO and the May legislative demolition of IRA tax credits happened before the Iran war was even on the horizon as an imminent event. Those decisions locked in the vulnerability. By the time February 28 arrived, there was nothing to fall back on that wasn't tied to global oil markets.

The Russia piece is the one that doesn't have a clean innocent explanation. By March 2026 the administration had spent a year arguing that sanctions on Russia were a priority. Those sanctions were measurably working -- oil revenue down from 45% to 20% of the federal budget.

Then one phone call with Putin and a war-driven price spike, and the sanctions are partially unwound within a week. Zelenskyy noticed. The Europeans noticed. The argument that it was purely reactive to the Hormuz closure runs into the fact that Europe faced the same crisis and refused to do the same thing.

What the timeline tells you overall is that the framing of "energy dominance" was always about which energy sources dominate -- not about American independence from volatile global markets. The one energy sector that actually insulates Americans from Middle East oil shocks -- domestic renewables, priced locally, not subject to Hormuz -- was the one systematically eliminated. That's not an accident of priorities. That's a choice with a direction.

Whether it's corruption, ideology, or just the logical endpoint of who funds what in American politics is a separate question. The timeline doesn't answer that. But it does make the innocent explanation -- that these were just a series of unrelated domestic policy preferences that happened to converge on this outcome -- very hard to sustain.

Summarizing what this describes for an administration that follows this timeline, what supports these actions as a desired endpoint?

The desired endpoint, if you follow the logic of every action rather than the stated rationale, is this:

An America permanently dependent on fossil fuels, with the institutional, legal, and financial capacity to transition away from them dismantled at every level -- regulatory, legislative, scientific, and linguistic -- while the industries that benefit from that dependence are subsidized, protected, and politically entrenched for a generation.

What supports these actions is a coalition of interests that all converge on the same outcome, even if they don't share identical motives:

The fossil fuel industry gets the obvious thing -- market protection from a cheaper competitor that was beginning to outprice them without subsidies. Solar and wind were winning on economics alone by 2024. That had to be stopped by policy because it couldn't be stopped by the market.

The petrostate adjacency -- and this is where Russia becomes impossible to ignore -- is that high oil prices and a weakened energy transition benefit Moscow structurally. Not just in the short term of the Iran war windfall. A US that stays oil-dependent stays exposed to exactly the kind of leverage Russia and Gulf states have always held. An America running on domestic solar and wind is geopolitically emancipated in a way that a Russia or a Saudi Arabia cannot afford.

The ideological component is real but secondary. The climate denial framework -- calling the Endangerment Finding into question, erasing the vocabulary, dismissing the science -- isn't just belief. It's institutional capture. If you eliminate the legal basis for federal climate action and the professional class trained to execute it, the next administration that wants to reverse course finds an empty building. That's not policy disagreement. That's succession planning for a permanent outcome.

The political economy underneath all of it is Citizens United and what it enabled -- the fossil fuel donor class having essentially unmediated access to both legislative and executive decision-making. You don't need a conspiracy when the incentive structure produces the behavior automatically.

So what this administration describes, taken as a coherent whole rather than a series of discrete decisions, is a government that has been captured by the industries most threatened by the energy transition, executing a systematic rollback of every mechanism that transition depended on, while a war they started handed the greatest near-term benefit to the foreign government that has the most to lose if that transition ever completes.

The endpoint isn't energy dominance. The endpoint is energy lock-in. A country that cannot structurally leave the 20th century energy system regardless of what a future administration wants to do, because the financial incentives, the legal framework, the scientific infrastructure, and the institutional vocabulary to do otherwise have all been removed.

That's what the timeline describes. Whether it was designed that way or simply fell that way because of who was in the room making the decisions -- that's the question historians will spend a long time on. But the outcome is the same either way.

So, in a sentence...

An administration that systematically dismantled every alternative to fossil fuel dependency, started a war that made that dependency a crisis, then used the crisis to reward the foreign government that benefits most from America never leaving the 20th century energy system.

Russia?

Yes.

Cheers! Sláinte! Na zdravie!